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Abstract
An upcoming trend in the current IT-landscape is to outsource services to so called
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). However, many companies are still sceptical to
this new kind of services, since they bring about a certain loss of control. For this
reason, it is important for CSPs to show that their services are secure. There are
several options in proving this and it is up to every CSP to choose which of those
options, in this report referred to as assessment schemes, that suits them best.
The question is, how do they make this choice?
In the starting phase of this thesis project, an extensive information search was
carried out. More than 30 different certifications, standards, attestations, ratings,
assessments, reports, compliances or audits, touching upon this subject were found.
Add to the equation that much of the information found was questionable or
straight out incorrect, and the question of which assessment scheme to concentrate
on becomes quite complex.
The described problem was identified by the Belgian company Ferranti Com-
puter Systems, who just opened up their cloud services to customers. In collabo-
ration with them, the following three goals were defined to solve the problem:
• Create a clear overview of the cloud assessment schemes that exist on the
market
• Provide methods to categorize or compare assessment schemes
• Make a case study on Ferranti Computer Systems demonstrating how the
accomplishments can be put to practice
To fulfill those goals, three main deliveries were created. First of all an overview
including a short explanation of relevant assessment schemes on the market. Sec-
ond, a comparison of assessment schemes in terms of risk mitigation. Four known
cloud risks were put forward and some surprising observations were made. The
third delivery was a case study on Ferranti Computer Systems. Previous find-
ings in combination with results from interviews were used to select a suitable
assessment scheme for their cloud platform.
The assessment scheme they chose was more or less unknown to everyone at
Ferranti Computer Systems. It was the research that opened their eyes to this new
assessment scheme and convinced them to try something new, rather than choosing
something they knew about by reputation. Seeing how the investigation changed
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their mind, it became obvious how important it is to create more transparency
in the world of assessment schemes. It is essential that companies choose the
assessment scheme that is most suitable for them and that they have a clear
understanding of why it is suitable. This thesis proves the need for clarity among
cloud security assessment schemes and presents methods to achieve this clarity.
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Introduction
When talking about the unstoppable trend of cloud computing the first thing that
crosses many peoples mind is, "Is it really hundred percent reliable?" The doubt
lies in many different factors such as the quality of providers, the loss of control
but maybe most of all in the security assurance. Is the data actually safe, can
I be sure that it will not be lost and that outsiders will not be able to access
it? Obviously, no person or company can actually assure this to the full extent.
New threats are arising every day and so far the inventors of threat mitigation are
behind in the race against the inventors of the threats. However, something that
can be assured, or proved, is that a certain cloud service is as safe as it can be
from a work-practical perspective, considering the threats we know about today.
There are several options in proving this and it is up to every Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) to choose which of those options that suits them best. The ques-
tion is, how do they make this choice? What makes one option more suitable than
another? And how do you actually reach or live up to your desired assessment
scheme, meaning certification, standard, attestation, rating, assessment, report,
compliance or audit?
In the following chapters, you can read about how this thesis project helped
an upcoming CSP on their journey.
1.1 Background
The project was carried out at the Belgian company Ferranti Computer Systems,
which in the rest of this publication will be referred to as Ferranti. Their main
business is to deliver software and hardware solutions to customers’ private infras-
tructure. These customers are more and more looking for a full service, where they
are no longer dependent on local infrastructure. Ferranti has therefore developed
a private cloud solution that provides their clients with all required capabilities.
When selling cloud solutions as a service an important aspect is to show that
the service is secure. A common way of proving this is to adopt an assessment
scheme. However, on the market today, many different assessment schemes can
be found. This makes it hard for CSPs to know which ones to pick. The process
of implementing assessment schemes is, most of the time, quite cost and resource
consuming. For this reason it is important that companies know which assessment
schemes to focus on. Additionally they have to be able to make a plan on how to
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acquire and maintain the chosen ones.
1.2 Problem Definition and Project Goals
As mentioned in the background section above, there is an abundance of assessment
schemes on the market. Most of them have a unique focus but they often overlap
in one way or another. First of all it is hard to know which assessment schemes
that exists. Second, it is not clear for which purpose they are designed or what
they actually assure. Third, it is close to impossible to know which overlaps that
exists among them.
Of those reasons every CSP that wants to reach certification or similar target
will have to start with unveiling the mystery around which assessment scheme to
engage in. A big threshold is hereby created and many CSPs are forced to hire
consultancy to even understand the basics. The question is, is it really this com-
plicated? Maybe relevant assessment schemes could be assembled and presented
in plain English? Maybe there is a way to compare or categorize them?
Every CSP is special. Services are designed in various ways, customers reside
in different parts of the world and both have individual needs or motivations.
To define an assessment scheme process that fits every single CSP is therefore
impossible. However, there must be a way to make the process more transparent.
Striving towards this ambition, the current thesis has three main goals:
• Create a clear overview of the cloud assessment schemes that exists on the
market
• Provide methods to categorize or compare assessment schemes
• Make a case study on Ferranti demonstrating how the accomplishments can
be put to practice
Chapter2
Methodology
To begin with, an extensive information search was carried out, to see which
assessment schemes that were available on the market. The relevant ones were
collected in an overview, which can be found in Chapter 3. Once this overview
was finished, ways to compare the assessment schemes was investigated. It is
commonly known that a big problem with cloud services is security assurance,
therefore the decision was made to make a comparison in terms of risk mitigation.
This comparison can be found in Chapter 4.
In the next step, focus was put on Ferranti, where employees and internal
customers were interviewed. Partly to find more ways of comparing the assessment
schemes but also, more importantly, to see which of them that could be a good
option for Ferranti. With the result from the interviews as a base, tables and
charts were created. Using these, a filtering was performed, which resulted in
three different alternatives. The final choice of which assessment scheme to pick
was put in the hands of people from Ferranti. To facilitate them in making this
decision, a SWOT analysis for each of the remaining options was created. Assisted
by those, the involved people came to an agreement and an assessment scheme was
selected. Information regarding the interviews can be found in Chapter 5 while an
ingoing description of the filtering can be found in Chapter 6.
2.1 Applied methods in the thesis
2.1.1 SWOT
During a SWOT analysis an organization compares its own capabilities, in terms of
strength and weaknesses, with the external environment, in terms of opportunities
and threats. They want to investigate how future developments and influences
coming from outside the organization can form a challenge to their current business
processes and models. Based on this insight they can make better decisions on
how to tackle these factors. The illustration in Figure 2.1 serves as an example of
how a SWOT is usually made.
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Table 2.1: Example of a SWOT diagram
The SWOT model in this thesis placed three assessment schemes as the central
point of attention. For each one of them a closer look was taken at what their
strengths and weaknesses were to compare them to what opportunities and threats
they formed from Ferranti’s perspective.
Chapter3
Cloud Assessment Schemes Overview
An overview of assessment schemes relevant to CSPs. As an aid to the reader, a
list of presented assessment schemes can be found below.
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3.1 Service Organization Control (SOC) framework
Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 70 was a recognized standard used in third-
party auditing for service organizations. The original focus of this standard was
financial reporting. However, it got stretched over the years to also cover assurance
of other types of controls, such as managed security services and data center co-
location services [1].
SAS 70 was on June 15th 2011 effectively replaced by Statement on Standards
for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) 16 for use in the U.S. and International
Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3402 for global use [2]. The two of
them are very similar but have a few differences, which can be found in [3]. These
two standards are focused solely on controls regarding financial reporting. When
carrying out an auditing regarding any of those two standards, you will receive a
so called SOC 1 report. This will state the efficiency and accuracy of which the
controls are fulfilled within the service organization. There are two different types
of SOC 1 reports, type I and type II. The difference between the two is that type
I only refers to a certain point in time while type II refers to a period of time [4].
An audit regarding other matters than financial reporting, will instead be
made according to the standards Attestation Standard (AT) 101, for use in U.S.
and ISAE 3000, for global use [1][5]. The controls in these standards are typically
related to IT and evaluates a service organization’s information systems with re-
spect to security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality or privacy [6][4].
Figure 3.1: Visual overview of the SOC framework
An audit of any of those two standards can result in either a SOC 2 report
or a SOC 3 report. The choice of which one to acquire is made by the service
organization. The difference between them is that SOC 2 is made for internal use
and SOC 3 is made for public use. This means that a SOC 2 report carries highly
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technical details and sometimes secret information, while a SOC 3 report is more
general and carries only information that can be used for marketing. The more
detailed SOC 2 can, just as SOC 1, be acquired in type I or type II [4].
Something very important to note when talking about SOC reporting frame-
work is that just because you have gone through an audit regarding one of the
mentioned standards and received a SOC report, it does not mean that you hold
any kind of certification. The only thing you have is a report on compliance status
[7][8].
A visual overview of the SOC framework can be seen in Figure 3.1.
3.2 ISO standards for CSPs
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has released an uncount-
able number of standards over the years. This cloud assessment schemes overview
presents the ones considered valuable to CSPs, namely the ISO 9000 family of
Quality Management System (QMS) standards, the ISO 27000 family of Informa-
tion Security Management System (ISMS) standards, the ISO 20000 family for
Service Management System (SMS) standards as well as the two standalone cloud
computing standards ISO 17788:2014 and ISO 17789:2014. Figure 3.2 shows an
overview of those standards and which ones that allow for official certification.
3.2.1 ISO 9000 series for QMS
The ISO 9000 series is probably the most widely known standard series published
by the ISO [9]. It can be implemented by all kinds of organizations and ensure
quality in organizations’ processes and products [10]. The series consists of four
standards. Firstly ISO 9001:2015, which is the only standard in the series that
you can become certified against. The reason for this, is that it defines the actual
requirements of a QMS [11]. Then there is the ISO 9000:2005, which explains the
overall concept of the series as well as the terms and vocabulary being used [12].
For sustained success on a long-term basis, there is the ISO 9004:2009 [13]. This
standard goes beyond ISO 9001:2015 and provides guidance on how to further
improve general performance [12]. Lastly, there is the ISO 19011:2011 (earlier
referred to as ISO 10011), which offers guidance on audits of quality management
systems [14].
3.2.2 ISO 27000 series for ISMS
ISO 27001:2013 is a list of requirements that need to be fulfilled to achieve an
ISO 27001:2013 certified ISMS. A portion of those requirements goes into the
details of information security risk treatment. A part of this portion is to go
over a pre-defined list of controls and make sure all necessary controls have been
implemented. The pre-defined list can be found in Annex A of the ISO 27001:2013
standard. There you can find a short description of every control, about one
sentence long. If you then look in the ISO 27002:2013 standard you will find
the same list of controls, even with the same numbering. However, here the one
sentence describing the control will also be followed by implementation guidance
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Figure 3.2: Graphical overview of ISO standards relevant to CSPs
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and other information regarding the control. All in all ending up with about one
page per control [15].
Important to note is that ISO 27002:2013 does not include any sort of require-
ments, which is why you cannot become certified against it. However, an audit
firm, with good enough knowledge on the subject, can make an informal review or
audit against ISO 27002:2013. By going through one of those you can show that
you have your security model under control even though you have not achieved an
ISO 27001:2013 certification [16][17][18][19].
ISO 27001:2013 is the only standard within the 27k series that you can achieve
an official certification against. The rest of the standards offer guidance on a cer-
tain subject and are to be used as a complement to the ISO 27001:2013 standard
[15][20][21]. The subject of some standards in the ISO 27000 series can be seen
in Figure 3.2. Looking at the sector specific standards there is one named ISO
27018:2014 and one named ISO 27017:2015. These two standards are both con-
nected to cloud security and shall be used for guidance on how to implement
controls from ISO 27001:2014 in a cloud computing setting. They can be seen as
an extension of 27002:2013 and just as with this standard, an informal review or
audit against them can be carried out. However, an official certification against
them is not possible [22].
3.2.3 ISO 20000 series for SMS
ISO 20000 has a different way of numbering the standards than the ISO 9000 and
ISO 27000 series. However, it can still be referred to as a series and the different
parts of ISO 20000 are still comparable with the different standards in the ISO
27000 and ISO 9000 series. There is a standard that lists terms and vocabulary
for the series, however here it is named ISO 20000-10:2013. ISO 20000-1:2011 is
just as ISO 9001:2015 and ISO 27001:2013, a list of requirements that needs to be
fulfilled to reach certification. ISO 20000-2:2012 is a code of practice, which gives
more ingoing information about each requirement in ISO 20000-1:2011, including
information on how to implement them [23].
ISO 20000-3:2012 gives guidance on scope definition, which is of great help
when applying ISO 20000 series on a bigger organization. ISO 20000-4:2010 is
supposed to describe each process in ISO 20000-1, in terms of purpose and out-
comes. However, ISO 20000-4:2010 is outdated and not aligned to ISO 20000-
1:2011 [24][23]. ISO 20000-5:2013 gives an example of an implementation plan
for ISO 20000 series with hints and templates [23][25]. The newest standard in
the series is the ISO 20000-9:2015, which provides guidance for organizations that
want to apply ISO 20000-1:2011 on cloud services [26].
ITIL 2011 framework
Next to the ISO 20000 series there is Information Technology Infrastructure Li-
brary (ITIL) 2011. This is not a standard but a best practice library with focus
on operational processes. It gives you advice on how you can implement processes
but it does not say that you have to do it according to this advice [27]. It is similar
to ISO 20000-2:2012 but does not have a direct connection to each requirement in
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ISO 20000-1:2011. It also has a wider and deeper scope, meaning it covers more
processes and gives more in-depth knowledge about how to implement them [28].
It is advised to implement ITIL in combination with the ISO 20000 series.
ITIL will be of great help in understanding the details of the processes needed to
be implemented to reach ISO 20000-1:2011 certification [28]. Furthermore, there
is at the time of writing a standard called ISO 20000-11 being developed, which
will lay out the relationship between the ISO 20000 series and ITIL [23].
3.2.4 Other ISO standards related to cloud computing
Except for the ISO series mentioned above there are two more ISO standards with
value to CSPs, namely ISO 17788:2014 and ISO 17789:2014. These standards
do not contain any requirements, meaning you cannot get certified against them.
They simply explain the basic terminology and architectural framework of the
cloud industry [29].
3.3 CSA Open Certification Framework (OCF)
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) OCF combines well known standards from the
market with tools from CSA, in an attempt to make a globally accepted, easy to
work with framework for security recognition of CSPs. It consists of three levels,
namely self-assessment, third-party assessment-based certification and continuous
monitoring-based certification [30][31]. Figure 3.3 shows an illustration of the three
levels.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the CSA OCF
At the first and basic level, the CSP makes a self-assessment using either
the CSA Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) [32] or the CSA Consensus Assessments
Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) [33]. The CSP can submit the report from the
self-assessment to the CSA, they will then make sure it becomes publicly available
[34].
The second level holds three different alternatives of third-party assessment.
CSA STAR Attestation, which is a combination of SOC 2 and CSA CCM and
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CSA STAR Certification, which is a combination of ISO 27001:2013 and CSA
CCM. Important to note, is that the CSA STAR Attestation results in a report
on compliance, while the CSA STAR certification results in a certification [35].
Lastly, there is also the CSA C-STAR Assessment, which is specialized on the
Chinese market and therefore combines CSA best practises with Chinese national
standards [31].
The third level is still under development but will be built on CSA best prac-
tices and handle continuous auditing and assessment [36].
3.4 EuroCloud Star Audit (ECSA)
The ECSA is an assessment schemes focused solely on certification of cloud ser-
vices. Just as with the CSA Open Framework, the first step in getting certified
is to perform a self-assessment. In ECSA’s case this is done through their online
assessment tool. The result of this self-assessment can be published on the web-
site of ECSA but demonstrates only what a certain CSP thinks of themselves. To
acquire an official ECSA certification the CSP must go through an official audit
carried out by an ECSA accredited auditor organization [37][38][39].
3.5 TÜV Rheinland Cloud Security Certification
TÜV Rheinland is a technical service provider, offering solutions globally within
safety and certification. One of the certifications they are offering is the TÜV
Rheinland Cloud Security Certification. The requirement catalogue of the certifi-
cation is based on studies, regulations and recommendations as well as standards
such as ISO 27001. The company is based in Germany, where it is currently also
the most recognized independent inspection authority. Certificates can only be
issued directly by TÜV Rheinland [41][42].
3.6 PCI security standards
The standards from the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council
(SSC) focus mainly on payment card data security. The most common of these
standards is PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) which is very important for all
merchants, or service providers, that handle any sort of cardholder data. It pro-
vides processes for everything from prevention and detection to mitigation and
treating of security incidents.
Apart from this key standard PCI SSC also provides three more standards.
PCI PIN Transaction Security (PTS), which holds a list of requirements for PIN
terminals. PCI Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS), which
can be used for approval of payment applications. PCI Point-to-Point Encryption
(P2PE), which offers a list of requirements covering the whole framework and
ensures a safe P2PE solution [40]. It is easy to see how the standards from PCI
SSC are connected in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Graphical representation of PCI security standards
3.7 LEET Security Rating
LEET Security is a rating agency for Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) Services, the first one of it’s kind in Europe. They are based in Spain, where
they have been operating since their start in 2010. They rate all sorts of services
offered by ICT service providers and are specialized on information security in
cloud environments [44]. Worth noticing is that they do not certify the providers
as a whole, they rate only their individual services. This means that the same
provider can have different ratings on their different services.
A rating is split up in three dimensions, Confidentiality, Integrity and Avail-
ability and based on a list of controls. Each of these dimensions will be appointed
to a grade ranging from A to E, where A is the best score. A service rating is
thereby made up by a three-letter combination, where any of these letters can be
changed based on follow up activities. Follow up is performed through random
audits, feedback from the users of the service as well as obliged reporting from
service provider when changes, that can effect the rating, are made. As with star
ratings of hotel chains, the service provider decides themselves which level of rat-
ing that they want to achieve. An audit is then performed by LEET security and
certification, with the desired letter combination, will be granted if the controls
required for this rating are in place.
In addition to the three letters a star (*) or a plus (+), can be added to the
rating. The star means that the service is also compliant with version 2.0 of the
PCI DSS standard and the plus means that the service is also compliant with the
Spanish privacy Law 15/1999 and regulatory development, RD 1.720/2007. Those
symbols are added to the letter representing the confidentiality dimension, which
is also the dimension they are applicable to [45].
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3.8 CIF Self-Certification
Cloud Industry Forum (CIF) is a membership-based not-for-profit organization
situated in the United Kingdom. It was created by a couple of organizations, from
the cloud industry, to solve the problem of lack of transparency and trust in cloud
services. They wanted it to become easier for cloud service customers to compare
CSPs and to trust cloud services in the same way they trust traditional services
[46].
Their solution to this problem was to create a code of practice for CSPs. This
code of practice consists of guidelines and best practices on how to provide good
quality services in the cloud [47]. CSPs can certify themselves against this code of
practice through a self-certification process [48]. Since it is a self certification, this
is done with an organizations own resources. Detailed instructions of the procedure
can be found on the website of CIF. However, to keep the code of practice up to
date and to keep the organization going, a small certification fee is taken out by
CIF on a yearly basis. This fee is dependent on the CSPs turnover and is ranging
from £200 to £3500 [46].
Once the self-certification process is finished the CSP is allowed to use the
certification logo of CIF and will be listed on the website of CIF. To keep the logo
and the spot in the list, a yearly self-certifications is required. In a similar way as
LEET security, CIF will carry out random checks of conformity as well as listen
in on complaints regarding non-compliance [49].
3.9 HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is part of the
U.S. legislation. It is subdivided into five titles, covering different areas of the
safekeeping of protected health information (PHI). The second one of those titles,
HIPAA Title II, provides standards connected to electronic access to and electronic
transaction of health information [50]. Certification against those standards is not
possible. However, every organization that is active in the U.S. market and handles
PHI has to make sure they are compliant [51][52]. The determination of whether
an organization is compliant is up to themselves to make. Important to note is,
however, that failure to comply counts as violating the U.S. law and can result in
serious consequences [53].
3.9.1 HITECH
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act is an extension to HIPAA that was created to support the adoption and
meaningful use of electronic health records (EHR) and other health information
technology [54][55].
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Comparison in terms of Risk Mitigation
When comparing assessment schemes, an important aspect is security and risk
mitigation. Therefore, a comparison was performed, disclosing which counterac-
tions to risks that are assured in the different assessment schemes. The choice of
which risks and counteractions to include is based on knowledge gained from web
and computer security courses at Lund University as well as the article "The 5
cloud risks you have to stop ignoring" by Roger A. Grimes [56].
In the analysis the Cloud Certification Schemes Metaframework (CCSM) [57],
created by The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA), was used. This is a framework that includes most of the assessment
schemes in the overview. It has a list of predefined security objectives with short
descriptions. When choosing one or more of those security objectives, it produces
a matrix showing which of the assessment schemes that have addressed the chosen
security objectives. Worth noticing is that what in this report is refereed to as an
assessment scheme is in the CCSM referred to as a certification scheme. However,
the two words have the same meaning.
Counteractions to some of the defined risks could be found among those se-
curity objectives and this was used as a base in the comparison. In case a risk
was not fully addressed by the security objectives in the CCSM, documentation
about the assessment schemes was analyzed to see whether the risk was specifically
addresses or not. The security objectives that were used can be found in Table 4.1.
The CCSM includes the following assessment schemes:
• SOC 2 report
• SOC 3 report
• ISO 27001 Certification
• CSA Self Assessment
• CSA STAR Attestation
• CSA STAR Certification
• EuroCloud Star Audit
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• EuroCloud Self Assessment
• TÜV Rheinland Cloud Security Certification
• LEET Security Rating
• CIF Self-Certification
The rest of the assessment schemes in the overview were excluded from this
part of the investigation.
CCSM Security Objective Description
1. Information security policy Cloud provider establishes and maintains an in-formation security policy
6. Security knowledge and training
Cloud provider verifies and ensures that personnel
have sufficient security knowledge and that they
are provided with regular security training
7. Personnel changes
Cloud provider establishes and maintains an ap-
propriate process for managing changes in person-
nel or changes in their roles and responsibilities
9. Security of supporting utilities
Cloud provider establishes and maintains appro-
priate security of supporting utilities (electricity,
fuel, etc.)
10. Access control to network and
information systems
Cloud provider establishes and maintains appro-
priate policies and measures for access to cloud
resources
11. Integrity of network and infor-
mation systems
Cloud provider establishes and maintains the in-
tegrity of its own network, platforms and ser-
vices and protect from viruses, code injections and
other malware that can alter the functionality of
the systems
14. Asset management
Cloud provider establishes and maintains asset
management procedures and configuration con-
trols for key network and information systems
18. Disaster recovery capabilities
Cloud provider establishes and maintains an ap-
propriate disaster recovery capability for restoring
cloud services provided in case of natural and/or
major disasters
19. Monitoring and logging policies Cloud provider establishes and maintains systemsfor monitoring and logging of cloud services
22. Checking compliance
Cloud provider establishes and maintains a pol-
icy for checking compliance to policies and legal
requirements
23. Cloud data security
Cloud provider establishes and maintains appro-
priate mechanisms for the protection of the cus-
tomer data in the cloud service
Table 4.1: CCSM Security Objectives used in the comparison
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4.1 Known Risks and Counteractions
4.1.1 Access by unauthorized users
To avoid the risk of unauthorized users getting access to the cloud platform, strong
authentication is crucial. This involves user credentials being stored safely and
kept up to date. Only the most vital users should have access and these people
should be well educated in how to treat their credentials.
Mitigation to this risk can be found in the CCSM, embodied by three differ-
ent security objectives. 6 and 10, which both turned out to be addressed by all
the assessment schemes in the CCSM. Additionally 7, which is addressed by all
assessment schemes except EuroCloud Self Assessment.
4.1.2 Several customers on the same platform
A CSP will host several customers on the same platform, which means that they
will share resources. This comes with the risk that the customers might find out
about each other or even be able to reach each others data. To overcome this
risk it’s important that the infrastructure of the CSP offers a strictly divided and
isolated environment for each customer.
In the CCSM, there are two security objectives that touch upon this subject,
namely 23 and 10. Security objective 23 should ensure that one customer’s data
is separated from other customers data. However, segregation on platform level
is hard to achieve and requires that you set up an infrastructure per customer
with virtualization techniques. By doing this, customer isolation can be achieved
to a certain level but hardware devices are still, in practise, shared by multiple
customers. Therefore, security objective 10 will also be of great help in supporting
the segregation of customers’ infrastructures. As earlier mentioned, is security
objective 10 being addressed by all the assessment schemes in the CCSM. Con-
sidering then security objective 23, this is addressed by all except the ISO 27001
certification.
However, important to note is that these two security objectives are still quite
general and do not provide a hard guarantee of isolation between customers. To
find out which ones of the assessment schemes that offers this, the documentation
of each one of them were analyzed. The conclusion is that the following assessment
schemes are addressing the matter of separation between customers directly, the
rest are not.
• CSA Self Assessment
• CSA STAR Attestation
• CSA STAR Certification
• TÜV Rheinland Cloud Security Certification
• LEET Security Rating
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4.1.3 Deviating IT-security policy
There is a risk that the CSP and its services does not live up to the IT-security
policies of the cloud customer. Some customers have strict regulations regarding
where and how they can store data, how it is being processed, what it is being
used for and so on. For these customers it is of greatest importance that the
CSP is complying to necessary policies and legal requirements and that they have
procedures to keep them updated.
Of course, there can be very specific regulations for specific businesses, but in
the general case this risk is covered by security objectives 1 and 22. These two
security objectives have both been addressed in all the assessment schemes in the
CCSM.
4.1.4 Inaccessible data
When storing data in the cloud there is a risk that it is not always available. This
can be due to system failure or simply a lack of Internet access. There is also the
worse case when the data disappears entirely due to malicious attacks or other
types of hazards. To avoid this you have to make sure that your CSP is offering
high availability, excellent backup systems and disaster recovery solutions.
In the CCSM there are five security objectives that represents the most im-
portant building blocks in mitigating this risk. First of all 18 and 11, which speaks
for themselves. To take into account the physical part of the CSP solution there
is 9, which certainly is a vital part of offering high availability. Here is also 14
of greatest importance. This security objective makes sure that the CSP has a
contingency plan for ensuring that vital parts of their system gets replaced due to
end-of-life or breakdown. Last but not least 19 was included, which gives a proof
of statements such as guaranteed up-time or successful backups.
With these security objectives you will have a solid base, it is however impor-
tant to note that every system is different and that further, more specific assurance
may be needed to guarantee that your data is always available.
Most of these security objectives have been addressed in most of the assessment
schemes. The exceptions are EuroCloud self-assessment, which has not addressed
9 or 14, and CIF self-certification, which has not addressed 19 or 14.
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4.2 Matrix Comparison
The matrix in Table 4.2 summarizes the findings. It shows the assessment schemes
as rows and the cloud risks as columns. In case an assessment scheme did not
address all aspects of a risk, the option partly addressed was chosen.
Table 4.2: Known cloud risks addressed per assessment scheme
20 Comparison in terms of Risk Mitigation
Chapter5
Interviews to Identify Key Characteristics
5.1 Who Was Interviewed?
When making a decision about which assessment scheme a company should try to
attain, it is important to get a clear understanding about the goals and expecta-
tions of this project. This can be achieved by a 360 degree activity, in which you
gather opinions from several various perspectives. Therefore, people with different
functions in the company were interviewed:
• Stijn Verhoeven, System Architect. Responsible for the design of Ferranti’s
cloud solution.
• Martina Vroblova, Quality and Business Process Manager at Ferranti, mean-
ing she handles certifications and audits within this subject.
• Johan Vandekerckhoeve, product manager of Ferranti’s internal customer
MECOMS. Knows what sort of requests and concerns that are coming in
from MECOMS customers.
• Rafael De Backer, Enterprise Architect at Ferranti ICT. Has a close eye on
the long term strategy for the cloud platform as well as a clear understanding
of the underlying infrastructure.
5.2 Analysis of Interviews
Early in the interview process it was observed that when you ask people which
assessment schemes they find important, they will mention the ones that they have
a notion about or that they know about by reputation. In an attempt to widening
the view of the interviewees, the cloud assessment schemes overview (Chapter
3) was sent out to them on beforehand. Still, most of them answered with the
probably most known one, ISO 27001, when getting the direct question of which
assessment scheme they thought would be most important to acquire for Ferranti’s
cloud platform. Maybe it is this simple, maybe you should just go for the one that
is most known. In this way you can use your assessment scheme for marketing and
effectively show customers that you are doing things according to best practices.
However, a closer look at the assessment schemes and the comparison of them,
will make one realize that it is not this simple. The recognition is certainly an
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essential factor when choosing assessment scheme but one will see that there are
also other important factors that needs to be taken into account. In the analysis of
the interviews it was therefore examined what the interviewees thought were the
most important characteristics in a good assessment scheme, rather than which
assessment scheme they named. Table 5.1 contains those characteristics and dis-
plays how they are realized in the different assessment schemes. This table also
holds some columns that are not directly connected to the interviews but that
were still considered meaningful to include.
Table 5.1: Key characteristics of the assessment schemes
5.3 Key Points from Interviews
Many helpful opinions came up during the interviews, below they are summarized
in a number of key points.
5.3.1 Preferably internationally recognized
In some of the interviews it came up that even if Ferranti for the moment is
operating mostly in Europe, there are future plans of going to America and Asia.
To be prepared for this, the assessment scheme they decide to go for should be
internationally recognized. For this reason a column was included, in Table 5.1,
listing the current operational area for the different assessment schemes.
5.3.2 The quality of the acknowledging party is essential
As an expert on certifications and audits, the Quality and Business Process Man-
ager at Ferranti took up the importance of having a good notified body or ac-
knowledging party. It should be one with quality auditor skills and a pragmatic
approach focused on business risks. Her opinion was that this would make it easier
to sell the added value to management. Obviously it is hard to map the auditor
skills offered on a personal level but at least a column, showing who is carrying
out the audit and acknowledging the proof of conformity, was introduced.
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5.3.3 Customers concerns should be in the center
All of the interviewees put forward the fact that one of the biggest reasons to
attain an official recognition of security is the customers. They are looking at
assessment schemes mostly because customers request it. The question is then,
what is the underlying expectation or motivation of the customers when requesting
a certification or similar official recognition of security? One of the interviewees
expressed that many customers are skeptical to the cloud and often show up with a
long list of requirements that needs to be fulfilled by the provider. To go through
those lists takes a lot of time, so something that could really make the tender
process more efficient, would be to work with an assessment scheme with a wide
scope. In this way the simple answer to many of those requirements could be just
a reference to controls or processes in this assessment scheme. Moreover, there
will be no discussion about the value of the solution provided. For this reason, a
category called Applicability was included in Table 5.1. Herein, it was noted down
what sort of organization the assessment scheme is aiming at. In this way one can
at least see which assessment schemes that have a too narrow or inaccurate scope.
5.3.4 Risk mitigation is a must
Apart from the importance of following customers’ requests, a couple of the in-
terviewees also mentioned risk mitigation as a main reason to attain an official
recognition of security. It is important to get to know the risks connected to cloud
computing and how to mitigate them. This so you can promise safety to man-
agement and customers, by for example making sure malicious attackers can not
harm the system. A comparison regarding risks and counteractions addressed in
most of the assessment schemes was made in Chapter 4. Hence, this could be used
instead of putting a column for risk mitigation in Table 5.1.
5.3.5 Recognition is an important factor
Even if you can not, as mentioned above, rely solely on the recognition of an
assessment scheme, of course it is still an important part. As mentioned by some
of the interviewees, certainly from a marketing perspective. It is something that
people know and trust, even if they do not exactly know what it actually assures.
Secondly as the Enterprise Architect at Ferranti ICT mentioned, you do not want
to be the early adapter of an assessment scheme. The bigger, more known players,
usually have several versions and revision behind their assessment schemes, which
of course makes it more reliable.
The question is then, how do you measure how known, recognized or developed
an assessment scheme is. This is certainly a quite substantial task and will of course
be dependent on the target group you pick. In this case the task has been simplified
by limitation of the target group to consisting solely of customers and employees of
Ferranti. It was performed by asking the interviewees which assessment schemes
they had heard of before and by looking at samples of customers’ requests for
proposals (RFP).
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Selection of an Appropriate Assessment
Scheme
6.1 Filtering of the Assessment Schemes
To make it easy to filter the assessment schemes based on the characteristics in
Table 5.1, a pivot chart was created. In this chart desired characteristics could be
selected and unwanted ones could be deselected. Figure 6.1 is showing the start
mode of the pivot chart, with all the assessment schemes included.
Figure 6.1: Pivot chart before filtering of the assessment schemes
Looking instead at Figure 6.2, a filtering has been performed with a selection
according to the opinions from the interviews. Since the cloud platform is only
a part of Ferranti’s business, it has to be an assessment scheme that is targeting
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Figure 6.2: Pivot chart after filtering of the assessment schemes
services and not only whole organisations. Therefore, Organizations has been
deselected in the target-box. Since Ferranti have future plans to expand from
their European market to America and Asia, it should be an assessment scheme
that is recognized world wide. Therefore, World wide has been selected as only
option in the box for current operational area. Due to Ferranti’s Quality and
Business Process Manager’s wish of having a quality auditor, Accredited 3rd party
has been exclusively chosen in the box for acknowledging party. Last but not least,
in the applicability box the very specific options Health Industry and Payment card
industry have been deselected. This to make sure it is an assessment scheme, with
a not too narrow scope.
Table 6.1: Known cloud risks addressed by the remaining assessment
schemes
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By carrying out this filtering, the original list of assessment schemes got re-
duced drastically. To see how the remaining assessment schemes scored in the risk
comparison an extraction from Table 4.2, showing known cloud risks addressed
per assessment scheme, was made. This extraction only holds the reduced list of
assessment schemes, and can be seen in Table 6.1.
As a last comparison point it was examined how recognized the assessment
schemes, in the reduced list, were among Ferranti’s employees and customers.
This was done by simply counting how many times an assessment scheme was
referred to in the RFPs as well as how many of the interviewees that stated that
they had heard about an assessment scheme before. The result can be seen in
Table 6.2, where it is also highlighted which one that turned out to be, by far, the
most recognized one.
Table 6.2: Recognition of assessment schemes among Ferranti cus-
tomers and employees
A compilation of the risk comparison and the recognition comparison can be
seen in Table 6.3. Based on this compilation, the decision was made of moving
further with the three options CSA Star Attestation, CSA STAR Certification as
well as ISO 27001 Certification.
Table 6.3: Compilation of the risk comparison and the recognition
comparison
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6.2 Last Comparison of Chosen Assessment Schemes
The final decision of which assessment scheme to go for, was put in the hands of
Ferranti themselves. To facilitate them in making this decision, a SWOT analysis
for each one of the three remaining assessment schemes was created.
These can be found in Figure 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5.
Figure 6.3: SWOT analysis of CSA STAR Attestation
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After careful consideration of the SWOT analyses, Ferranti decided that they
wanted to go further with the CSA STAR Certification (Figure 6.4). There were
several reasons to this decision. First of all they preferred an assessment scheme
that includes acquiring the ISO 27001, which is requested by many of their cus-
tomers. For this reason they opted out the CSA STAR Attestation (Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.4: SWOT analysis of CSA STAR Certification
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Second, they wanted an assessment scheme that is focused on mitigating risks
in a cloud environment. As shown in the risk comparison in Chapter 4, the ISO
27001 Certification (Figure 6.5) does not address all risks that are created when
data is moved to the cloud. The ISO 27001 certification was created before the new
challenges around cloud services arose and assures information security only on a
more general level. The same conclusion was drawn in the paper Analysis of ISO
27001:2013 Controls effectiveness for Cloud Computing [58], where the following
is stated in the abstract: "We come to the conclusion that ISO / IEC 27001:2013
compliance improves service providers and customer’s information security system
and build a trust relationship but not fulfil all requirements and cover all relevant
issues."
Figure 6.5: SWOT analysis of ISO 27001 Certification
Chapter7
The certification process
Once the decision for the most suitable assessment scheme was made, the question
arose on how to move further towards achieving it. Which steps would need to be
carried out to reach the CSA STAR Certification? For that reason, some guidance
for the CSA STAR Certification process is in this chapter presented.
7.1 CSA Self Assessment
The final goal for Ferranti is to acquire the CSA STAR Certification. However,
CSA strongly recommends all companies to start with completing the CSA Self
Assessment. This can be done either by filling in the CSA CAIQ or by creating
a personal report documenting compliance to the CSA CCM. The easiest option
is probably to fill in the CSA CAIQ. This questionnaire holds a list of control
specifications, which has been divided into 16 domains and 295 questions. Each
of these questions can be answered with simply “Yes”, “No” or “Not applicable”. A
cutout from the questionnaire can be found in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Cutout from the CSA CAIQ, showing the first control
specification from the domain Application & Interface Security
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The second option for the self assessment is to use the CSA CCM. This tool
contains the same list of control specifications, divided into domains, as the CSA
CAIQ. However, the domains are not further divided into specific questions. In-
stead the provider has to create a report documenting compliance to the CSA
CCM. On the other hand, the CSA CCM has the advantage that it shows how
the controls map to other industry-accepted security standards, regulations, and
controls frameworks. A cutout from the matrix can be found in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Cutout from the CSA CCM, showing the three first
control specification from the domain Application & Interface
Security and how they map to controls in ISO 27001:2013 and
Jericho Forum
In the end, this report or the CSA CAIQ can be submitted to the CSA and
they will display it on their website. Even if the CSP does not want to submit
the result of the self assessment, it is a great starting point for the certification
process. First of all it will help CSPs understand the background to why certain
things need to be implemented. Second, it will open their eyes to possible security
gaps in their current solutions.
7.2 Gain management support
No matter how close to, or far away from, security perfection your cloud solution
is, management support will be essential. A certification process will always be
costly and management has to be willing to make the investment. Furthermore, to
successfully achieve and keep the certification, all employees have to feel motivated
to work according to certain principles and understand why it is important to do so.
This can only be achieved if management understands the benefits of certification
and propagates it within the organisation.
In one of the interviews that was carried out (Chapter 5), the interviewee
explained that to gain management support, you have to convince them that the
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investment will have a clear return on investment. This can be done in several
different ways but one way of doing it will be to use the CSA CAIQ. By going
through the questions with ’No’ as answer, management will become aware of the
security gaps that exist at the moment. For efficiency diagrams can be created,
that display in which domains the biggest gaps are, an example can be found in
Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Diagram showing answer percentage per domain from
the CSA CAIQ. Domains are listed according to the percentage
of controls not in place. This makes it is easy to see which
domains that currently hold the biggest security gaps.
In relations to the security gaps, it is important to explain the consequences
they can bring and what sort of threats the platform is exposed to for the moment.
An overlooked risk can cause big damage and usually results in huge price tags
for recovery. Some price examples can be found in [59], wherein it is also stated
that "Leading research companies Gartner and Forrester both agree that the costs
of prevention are much lower than the costs of recovery after an attack or data
theft."
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To explain to management what needs to be done to minimize the security
gaps and how much the solutions will cost, Table 7.1 can be used.
Table 7.1: Table to be used in assessing finances and resources
needed in the certification project
The table works as an addition to the CAIQ. For every question that has been
answered with ’No’, a proposition of a possible solution must be given. Then
an estimation must be made how much this solution will cost in terms of hard-
ware/software as well as how many internal or external resources, in terms of man
days, that will be needed to implement the solution. In the end a diagram can
be made displaying which questions or controls that are cheapest to implement
and which require least resources. An example of such a diagram can be seen in
Figure 7.4. Weighting factors have been used in Table 7.1 to give the diagram a
nice shape.
Figure 7.4: Diagram to visualize which solutions that will be cheap-
est or least resource consuming to implement
In addition to this some sort of priority order will need to be made, showing
which controls that represent the biggest security risks and therefore are most
valuable and urgent to implement.
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7.3 From project plan to finalization
Once management support has been gained, the next step for the project team
will be to take a closer look at what needs to be achieved to reach the certification.
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.4 can be used as a base for this, since they show a prelim-
inary assumption of the work ahead. To reach more realistic numbers the project
team needs to logically regroup the different solutions into clearly defined separate
projects. Attaining of a certification is a huge task and requires detailed planning
in terms of time and resources. With a clearer view on the seperate projects, the
project team can make a better estimation of cost and man days of resources.
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.4 can be used as aids in making the new estimates. The
end result will be a feasibility study which can be presented to top management.
In this meeting it is important to point out the quick wins of each milestone in
the roadmap. With a good general assessment of the project costs and benefits,
management will hopefully give their final approval.
The real project work can now start by creation of project outlines for the
first group of projects. A project outline is an A4 page in which one shortly
introduces the project. It should include the goals and expectations, specify the
people involved (internal and external), present the budget needed and show the
big steps of the project in a timeline. Based on the project outlines the (by
management appointed) project sponsor can make a decision to make the different
resources (people and investments) available to the team.
The general planning and decision phase is then finished and one can start
with the execution of the projects. A good project manager needs to continuously
inform the sponsor about the progress of the project. This is usually done through
project reports. After finishing each project the project manager needs to write a
project review to seek continuous improvement in the team’s work.
When the project is finally finished the team needs to write a support and
maintenance plan. The finished project can then be transferred to the operational
team.
Section 7.2 and 7.3 are based on the course Software Engineering Process -
Economy and Quality at Lund University and its belonging course literature [60].
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Discussion and Conclusions
This thesis has investigated the matter of assessment schemes for CSPs. In par-
ticular assessment schemes that helps CSPs prove to their customers that their
services are secure. Many different assessment schemes, for this purpose, can be
found on the market today but not many good ways of comparing them. This
problem was identified and to solve it the following three goals were defined for
this thesis:
• Create a clear overview of the cloud assessment schemes that exists on the
market
• Provide methods to categorize or compare assessment schemes
• Make a case study on Ferranti demonstrating how the accomplishments can
be put to practice
To live up to those goals, three main deliveries were created. First of all
an overview including a short explanation of relevant assessment schemes on the
market. Second, a comparison of assessment schemes in terms of risk mitigation.
Third, a case study on Ferranti where previous findings in combination with results
from interviews were used to select a suitable assessment scheme for Ferranti’s
cloud platform.
8.1 Discussion
Looking at the first of the three goals, it was fulfilled through the cloud assessment
schemes overview in Chapter 3. However, something that needs to be mentioned in
relation to this, is the difficulty encountered in defining which assessment schemes
to include in the overview. Originally all sort of assessment schemes that could be
relevant for CSPs were supposed to be included. However, after a while it was rec-
ognized that this would be an impossible task. There are an uncountable number
of assessment schemes out there and the relevance of those will be dependent on
the CSP. Things that matter are for example what sort of data they want to store
on the platform, or in which country their customers are operating. Furthermore,
the relevance will also be dependent on the reason to certification or similar target.
Some CSPs might look into assessment schemes to assure security, while others
are looking into it to assure quality.
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As mentioned earlier, the creation of the overview began with a very wide
scope. Since it was recognized only along the way that the scope needed to be
narrowed down, the end result became a bit scattered. The majority of the assess-
ment schemes included, are focused on assuring security in a cloud environment.
However, there are also assessment schemes with completely different focuses and
scopes.
Something else that hampered the creation of the overview, was the amount
of questionable or incorrect sources of information. Several sources claimed quite
the opposite to each other. A lot of misunderstandings had been made along the
way and to clear those out took a substantial amount of time.
The next goal was to provide methods to categorize or compare assessment
schemes. In Table 5.1 a sort of categorization of most of the assessment schemes
in the overview was made. After creation of the overview, it was concluded that
some of the assessment schemes within it were less relevant for CSPs. Therefore,
these were not included in Table 5.1 or the rest of the investigation.
In addition to Table 5.1, a risk comparison in terms of risk mitigation was
carried out. The decision was made to concentrate on assessment schemes with a
focus on assuring security in a cloud environment. Therefore, it was considered
interesting to see how well they addressed known cloud risks. As described in
Chapter 4, the comparison was based on ENISA’s CCSM and its security objec-
tives. To map the defined cloud risks to these security objectives, turned out to
be quite challenging since there is not really a right and wrong. The descriptions
of the security objectives were very general and sometimes a bit unclear. They
had to be gone through carefully, several times, before a satisfactory result was
reached. With these things being mentioned the second goal is considered fulfilled.
The third goal was to make a case study on Ferranti demonstrating how the
accomplishments can be put to practice. Looking through the chapters above, it
is easy to see how the filtering and the SWOT analysis in Chapter 6 are based on
all the previous discoveries. The SWOT analyses led Ferranti to the final decision
of moving on further with CSA STAR Certification. Almost no one at Ferranti
had heard about this certification before and most of them were convinced that
the ISO 27001 certification would be the best alternative. The research opened
their eyes to other options and made them change their mind. This serves as a
clear proof that the findings were put to good use and that the third goal is hereby
accomplished.
8.2 Conclusions
In the creation of the cloud assessment overview, it turned out to be really difficult
to find trustworthy sources. As mentioned above, many sources were not clearly
defined and some even proved contradictory. Seeing this it could be concluded
that there is a great uncertainty surrounding these sort of assessment schemes.
Therefore an investigation like this was more than necessary and it can hopefully
be of great value to many companies.
When carrying out the case study on Ferranti it became obvious that the most
known assessment scheme is not always the best one. As can be seen in Table 6.2
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the ISO 27001 certification was, by far, the most recognized one. However, the risk
comparison in Chapter 4 and in particular Table 4.2, shows that the ISO 27001
certification leaves some things to be desired in terms of risk mitigation in the
cloud.
In the introduction, there was a general question regarding if it really has to
be as hard as unveiling a great mystery, to understand the world of assessment
schemes. Speculations were made concerning if it was possible to assemble and
present relevant assessment schemes in plain English and if there was a way to
compare or categorize them? By glancing through this report, anyone can conclude
that there are ways to make the world of assessment schemes more transparent.
This thesis is unique in the way that it both proves the need of clarity and shows
methods to achieve it.
8.3 Future work
The work carried out in this project represent one way of making the world of
assessment schemes less complex. Other methods can most likely be found and
the work in this thesis can definitely be expanded.
New assessment schemes or updates of existing ones are published on a reg-
ular basis. As a consequence, the work with presenting and comparing them can
continue in eternity. As the cloud and its associated services matures, the way of
proving that they are secure will most likely also mature. This should make the
future work of surveying assessment schemes easier.
The main goals of this thesis were all reached. However, another point dis-
cussed in the introduction, was that it is hard to see exactly how the different
assessment schemes are overlapping. It would be of great value to investigate
which controls in the different assessment schemes that are similar to each other.
In this way, a company holding one to begin withr official security recognition,
could easily see how many and which controls they need to implement to reach
others.
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